

Communication Strategy: Proper Structure Necessary But Not Sufficient

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Abstract

Communication Strategy: Proper Structure Necessary But Not Sufficient by LTC Tom Alexander Jr., U.S. Army, 61 pages.

Researching whether properly structured organizations, at combatant commands, develop more effective communication strategy is the purpose of this monograph. Proper structure is defined in current doctrine and key communication literature. Proper structure includes access, assessment, and capabilities. Senior military leaders argue doing the right thing is most important in communication strategy. This monograph argues that there is more to communication strategy than just doing the right thing. In order to analyze the complex issue of effective communication strategy, a systems approach is used. Effective is defined as educating, informing, and influencing target audiences to support American interests. The finding of this monograph is proper structure is necessary but not sufficient to develop effective communication strategy.

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Introduction

According to the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, the military has placed too much emphasis on strategic communication as a “thing.”¹ He states, “by organizing to it – creating whole structures around it-we have allowed strategic communication to become a thing instead of a process, an abstract thought instead of a way of thinking.”² Mullen argues that the military’s actions should speak for themselves. Mullen’s argument is a prevailing thought about strategic communication in the military.

Properly structured communication organizations at combatant commands should make more effective communication strategy.³ On its face, this statement seems like common sense. However, it is contested among senior military leaders and military communications professionals.⁴ Some senior officers argue that what you do is more significant than how you organize.⁵ Doing the right thing is important, but doing the thing right by having the right people in place to tell your story is beneficial as well. This monograph argues that a common communication structure composed of similar communication capabilities across combatant commands will produce the best effects.

¹ Michael G. Mullen, “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (August 28, 2009): 2.

² Ibid.

³ Joint Forces Command, *Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy, Version 3* (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, June 24, 2010), xi. For the purpose of this monograph the term communication strategy identifies the specific actions and messages developed and assessed by the communication organization at the Combatant Commands.

⁴ Ibid., v-4.

⁵ Mullen, “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics,” 2.

There are three prevailing thoughts among senior military leaders concerning strategic communication. First, many in the military consider strategic communication to be something new.⁶ The second idea is that strategic communication can be solved by a media savvy Commander.⁷ Lastly, strategic communication is not linked with normal military operations.

⁸These three thoughts are not correct.

Strategic communication is not new. Since 2006, Combatant Commanders have briefed the strategic communication strategy to the Department of Defense.⁹ JP 5-0 recognized the importance of strategic communication strategy as part of crisis action planning, contingency planning, and security action planning.¹⁰ Combatant commanders brief the strategic communication strategy to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of Joints Chiefs of Staff.¹¹ Not all combatant commanders are media savvy, but all have communication capabilities within their command.¹² The communication capabilities are not organized to assist combatant commanders with their communication responsibilities. The Department of Defense recognized

⁶ Mari K. Eder, “Toward Strategic Communication,” *Military Review* (July-August): 62.

⁷ David Ignatius, “Gen. Petraeus: The Right Commander for Afghanistan,” *Washington Post*, June 24, 2010. Gen. Petraeus’s effective communication with the media is often cited as a model for how commanders can deal with the challenges in strategic communication and communication strategy.

⁸ Dennis M. Murphy, “In Search of the Art and Science of Strategic Communication,” *Parameters* (Winter 2009-10): 107.

⁹ Joint Forces Command, *Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning* (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, December 26, 2006), xii.

¹⁰ Joint Forces Command, *Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning* (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, December 26, 2006), xii.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Joint Forces Command, *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations*, (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, March 22, 2010), x.

combatant commands have a problem communicating to promote American interests¹³. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication stated that the United States military “is not sufficiently organized, trained, or equipped to analyze, plan, coordinate, and integrate the full spectrum of capabilities available to promote American interests.”¹⁴ Because of this problem, an objective was established to properly resource combatant commands to organize, train, and equip its primary communication supporting capabilities. Those capabilities were outlined as public affairs, information operations, civil affairs, and defense support to public diplomacy.¹⁵ The Department of Defense clearly sought to address the organizational shortfalls and improve communication strategy.

Communication strategy is not a separate activity from normal military operations. Its activities (messages and nonlethal actions) should be integrated with normal military operations. Military operations are often interpreted only as lethal actions against an enemy; however, the purpose of lethal actions in military operations is to compel others to do your will.¹⁶ Likewise, the purpose of nonlethal actions and messages (communication strategy) in military operations is to educate, inform, and influence others to do your will. In this case, the “will” is that of the

¹³ Gordon England, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 25, 2006), 2

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Gordon England, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 25, 2006), 3.

¹⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

combatant command. Clearly, communication strategy, when understood this way, is an integral part of all military operations for combatant commands.

Combatant commanders are in an unprecedented position. Combatant commands, as an instrument for the Department of Defense, compel key domestic and foreign audiences to support United States Government policies.¹⁷ However the combatant commands do not take a common approach. The ten combatant commands have ten different communication organization structures.¹⁸

There are stated and unstated reasons for the differences among the combatant commands. The stated reason is the combatant commands have different missions in their respective areas of operations.¹⁹ The unstated reason is that the uniquely different operational environments drive differences in approach to strategic communication. The uniqueness is due to the different demographics and geographical composition of the combatant commands. Unfortunately, these two reasons fail to stand up to methodological analysis.

¹⁷ Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Weighs Use of Deception in a Broad Arena,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, December 13, 2004, <http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/headlines04/1213-03.htm> (accessed September 16, 2010). Mr. Di Rita stated in an interview that Combatant Commander “four-star military officers are the face of the United States abroad in ways that are almost unprecedented since the end of World War II.” This statement places extreme importance on understanding the difference between the operational level communication verses strategic level communication.

¹⁸ Jennifer Roy, e-mail message to author, “Strategic communication staff spread sheet,” February 26, 2010.

¹⁹ Robert L. Perry, “The Organization is Flat: An integrated Model for Strategic Communication within the Combatant Command” (monograph, Naval War College, November 6, 2007), 6.

In short, the theories that underpin the process of communication may make the unstated reason (uniqueness) invalid. In theory, the communication process consist of four parts (who, what, channel, and whom).²⁰ All combatant commands operational environments reflect these four parts. According to leading American political scientist and communications theorist, Harold Lasswell, a communication formulation is “who says what in which channel to whom with what effect.”²¹ This summation of the communication process has been widely quoted since the 1940s as seen in the work of David Foulger, for example.

More recently, communication expert David Fougler has built upon Lasswell’s theory of formulation, to expand the four original parts to five, by adding language.²² The five parts of Fougler’s model are creators, messages, media, languages, and consumers. The following explains how Fougler built on Lasswell’s formulation. Who (creator) says what (message) in which channel (media) in which language to whom (consumer) with what effect.

The five communication parts of Fougler’s model are part the combatant command’s operational environment. The following example illustrates this point. A combatant commander communicates his mission during a press briefing to reporters and key leaders in a specific country. In this example, the combatant commander is the creator. The information about the mission is the message. The journalists attending the press briefing are the media. The combatant

²⁰ Harold D. Lasswell, “The Structure and Function of Communication Strategy,” in *The Communication of Ideas*, (New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1948), 37.

²¹ Davis Foulger, “Models of the Communication Process,” abstract, <http://davis.foulger.info/research/unifiedModelOfCommunication.htm> (accessed February 25, 2010).

²² Ibid.

commander's message is interpreted into the country's primary language. The key leaders and the target audience are the *consumers*.

The combatant commands are part of a communication system. The communication system consists of the five communication parts. It is a system because the parts interact in a manner to produce both intended and sometimes unintended effects. The creator communicates a message through a media in a language that is communicated to consumer with an effect. The intended effect is to inform, educate, and influence the consumer.²³ Additionally, there is always a possibility for unintended effects.²⁴

Combatant commands use communication strategy, purposefully, to achieve the intended effects. The communication organization develops the communication strategy. Combatant Commands use communication strategy as creators or actors in the communication process model. They are part of a system. Therefore, a systems approach is a valid technique for analysis. Additionally, by borrowing concepts from systems theory -- efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness -- an analysis can be conducted of the combatant command's communication

²³ U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February, 2008), 7-4. Army doctrine describes informing, educating, and influencing as intended effects.

²⁴ Michael Hastings, "The Stanley McChrystal Scoop," Rolling Stone, June 22, 2010, <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236> (accessed June 22, 2010). Gen. McChrystal's comments were not intended to cause his removal from command.

organizations. Efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness are assessment criteria used in a soft systems approach.²⁵

This monograph assesses the combatant commands' communication organizations. The assessment provides a means to answer the question, does a more efficacious and efficient communication organization produce a communication strategy that more effectively informs, educates, and influences the combatant command's target audiences.

²⁵ Peter Checkland and John Poulter, *Learning for Action: A Short Definitive Account for Soft System Methodology and Its Use for Practitioners, Teachers, and Students* (West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2006), 38.

This monograph is significant because combatant commands are in an unprecedented position. They serve as the Department of Defense's instrument for developing and executing communication strategy that compels domestic and foreign audiences to support United States Government policies.²⁶

Organization of Paper

This monograph argues for a common communication organization structure. In order to make this argument, this paper provides a review of literature, an explanation of the methodology for analysis, examination of several case studies, and concludes with some observations and recommendations.

The literature review section defines key terms. The key terms are strategic communication, communication strategy, communication organization, efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness. In addition, the literature review section addresses two documents, which make recommendations regarding communication organizations. The methodology section describes the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the monograph. This mixed method is used to prove the hypothesis. The case studies section is an assessment of seven combatant commands. Six of the seven combatant commands are geographical commands. The other combatant command is a functional command. The title of the case studies section is geographical and functional commands. The observation section provides the combined analysis of the seven combatant

²⁶ Shanker and Schmitt, "Pentagon Weighs Use of Deception in a Broad Arena." Mr. Rita stated combatant commands are in a very good position to assist the Department of State with communicating to foreign audiences. The combatant commanders are constantly interacting with key stakeholders in their regions.

commands. The recommendation section provides insights from the analysis. The insights include a need for further research and a recommended common communication organizational structure. The conclusion is key points derived from the research and analysis of this monograph.

Hypothesis

The hypothesis is that a more efficacious and efficient communication organization produces communication strategy that more effectively informs, educates, and influences the combatant command's target audiences.

Literature Review

A review of current literature relevant to strategic communication reveals the importance of defining key terms. There are two sets of key terms. The first set of terms (strategic communication, communication strategy, communication organization) is important to understanding the communication process at the strategic and operational level. The second set of terms (efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness) is important to understanding the methodological analysis. Additionally, two documents must be examined because of their recommendations for communication organization structures. The two documents are Robert Perry's "The Organization is Flat: An integrated Model for SC within the Combatant Command" and the United States Joint Forces Command Commander's Handbook for SC and CS. The two documents make recommendations regarding organizational structure.

Key Terms

This section explains the terms strategic communication, communication strategy, and communication organization. The explanations are essential, because the processes and efforts of communication at the strategic and operational level are different.

S trategic Communication

The Quadrennial Defense Review Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap, 25

September 2006 defines strategic communication as a “focused United States Government process and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable and advance national interest and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.”²⁷ This definition makes strategic communication the responsibility of United States Government. Strategic communication is thus a strategic level process and effort. There is a difficulty identifying messages or actions as strategic or operational. This difficulty occurs because there is no distinct boundary between the strategic and operational.²⁸ The key to understanding the difference is recognition of the where the process and efforts generate the messages or actions. A message may have strategic, operational and tactical effects simultaneously.

Communication Strategy

Communication strategy is the term introduced by the United States Joint Forces Command, Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy. The term describes the development and execution of actions and messages at the operational

²⁷ Gordon, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap, 3.

²⁸ U.S. Army, Field Manual 5-0 The Operations Process (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, March 2010), 2-1.

level.²⁹ The term is only useful in theory but does not provide sufficient clarity in practice. In theory, the term, communication strategy, provides a cognitive separation between the strategic and operational level. In practice, an action or message conducted by a corporal at the tactical level in a platoon may have strategic effects.³⁰

Communication Organization

This monograph looks at communication organization. The term is introduced in order to name the organization that develop and execute communication strategy at the combatant commands. Currently, each combatant command has a different type of organization. The basic framework for all communication organizations is a director and a staff. This monograph assesses the different communication organizations across seven combatant commands. Efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness are the criteria used for assessing the communication organizations.

Efficacy, Efficiency, and Effectiveness

This section provides the origins and definitions of the terms efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness. Efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness are criteria from *Learning for Action: A Short Definitive Account for Soft System Methodology and Its Use for Practitioners, Teachers,*

²⁹ Joint Forces Command, *Commander's Handbook for Strategic and Communication Strategy*, Version 3, xi.

³⁰ Gen. Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines Magazine* 28, no. 1 (1999): 32.

and Students.³¹ These criteria will be used to assess the communication organization's communication strategy effectiveness. In addition, this section discusses the communication organization as part of a complex open communication system. Understanding how the communication organizations are part of a complex open system highlights the relevance for using efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness.

Communication organizations are part of a complex open system. Complexity is defined as "strong interactions among elements, so that current events heavily influence the probabilities of many kinds of later events."³² Communication is a transfer of ideas between people. People can gain different meanings from the ideas. People deriving different meanings from the transfer of ideas can cause different outcomes. This interaction of different people gaining different meanings producing different outcomes makes communications complex. The interdependence of the ideas, meanings, and people also makes communication complex.

Combatant Commands, a creator, build strategies to gain information superiority.³³ The strategies intended effect is inform, educate, and influence internal and external behavior of the

³¹ Checkland and Poulter, *Learning for Action: A Short Definitive Account for Soft System Methodology and Its Use for Practitioners, Teachers, and Students*, 38.

³² Steven R. Corman, "Complex System Problems in the War of Ideas," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2, no. 3. Corman cites theorist Niklas Luhmann who stated communication is a property of a complex system in which participants interpret one another's actions and make attributions about the thoughts, motivations, and intentions behind them. The complexity arises because of a double contingency. Given two communicators, A and B. The success of A's behavior depends not only on external conditions, but on what B does and thinks. But what B does and thinks is influenced by A's behavior as well as B's expectations, interpretations, and attributions with respect to A.

³³ Joint Forces Command, *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations*, xxii. The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while

target audience.³⁴ Communication strategy is the combatant command's purposeful human activity (messages and actions) to inform, educate, and influence the behavior of target audiences. A Combatant command's communication organization "transforms"³⁵ communication strategy in order to be more effective within the complex communication system.

The communication system is also what systems experts Checkland and Poulter would define as a *soft system*. A system is classified as soft if it involves interaction of humans.³⁶ Therefore, a soft systems methodology provides a means to measure the performance of combatant command's communication organizations within the complex communication system.

exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. The intended effect is that combatant commanders use communication strategy to gain the advantage in the complex communication system.

³⁴ U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2008), 7-4. The term information engagement in Field Manual 3-0 is used in a broader sense in this monograph. The intended effects are relevant to both Army and Joint operations. A combatant command is a joint headquarters.

³⁵ Checkland and Poulter, Learning for Action: A Short Definitive Account for Soft System Methodology and Its Use for Practitioners, Teachers, and Students, 42. Checkland and Poulter use the (T) to describe the purposeful activity. The purposeful activity is communication strategy. The criterion efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness are used to identify if the notional system, the communication organization, is (1) working in the sense of producing its intended outcome--efficacy, (2) transformation is being achieved with a minimum use of resources--efficiency, and (3) is the transformation by the notional system achieving some higher-level or longer term aim--effectiveness. Effectiveness is whether the communication strategy is informing, educating, and influencing the target audience.

³⁶ Steven R. Corman, "Complex System Problems in the War of Ideas" Perspective on Terrorism 2, no. 3. Corman cites theorist Niklas Luhmann who stated communication is a property of a complex system in which participants interpret one another's actions and make attributions about the thoughts, motivations, and intentions behind them. The complexity arises because of a double contingency. Given two communicators, A and B. The success of A's behavior depends not only on external conditions, but on what B does and thinks. But what B does and thinks is influenced by A's behavior as well as B's expectations, interpretations, and attributions with respect to A. The interaction of A and B is a social activity between human beings therefore this is a soft system.

Efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness are questions that provide a means to identify a correlation between the communication organizations structure and effective communication strategy.

It is necessary to explain efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the context of the communications organization and communication strategy. The criteria efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness are used to ask questions. The questions include:

(Efficacy) Is the communication organization is working in the sense of producing its intended outcome?

(Efficiency) Does the combatant command use the minimal number of capabilities or resources to develop communication strategy?

(Effectiveness) Does the communication strategy inform, educate, and influence the target audience?³⁷

Measuring Efficacy

Efficacy is defined by Checkland and Poulter as the criterion to tell whether the intended activity is “working; in the sense of producing the intended outcome.”³⁸ Efficacy, in the context the communication organization, is a determination of whether the communication organization meets the combatant commander’s intent. According to FM 3-0, the commander’s intent is “a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must establish

³⁷ Checkland and Poulter, Learning for Action: A Short Definitive Account for Soft System Methodology and Its Use for Practitioners, Teachers, and Students, 42.

³⁸ Ibid.

with respect to enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the desired end stated.”³⁹

Therefore, efficacy, as a measure of performance for the communication organization, is asking whether the organization meets commander’s intent.

Measuring the efficacy of a communication organization is a matter of determining two things- access and assessment.

Three sources provide an understanding of how efficacy relates to a communication organizations. “Strategic Communication: An Institutional Perspective” by Swara Sandu⁴⁰ and “The Institutionalization of the Strategic Communication Function in the United States” coauthored by Jerry Swerling and Chaite Sen⁴¹ define access in terms of communication.

Doctrine defines assessment.

Jerry Swerling and Chaiti Sen’s article explain access. There are three key points from this article. The first point assesses whether communication organization has access to the top decision maker in the organization and other key stakeholders. The second point assesses whether the organization has an enhanced perception by the leadership that its function is necessary. The third point assess whether the organization is integrated with other functions.⁴² Two key points are derived from this article (1) does the strategic organization have access to the other staff

³⁹ U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations, glossary-4.

⁴⁰ Swaran Sandhu, “Strategic Communication: An Institutional Perspective,” International Journal of Strategic Communication (2009).

⁴¹ Jerry Swerling and Sen Chaite, “The Institution of the Strategic Communication Function in the United States,” International Journal of Strategic Communication, (2009).

⁴² Ibid., 133.

sections within the combatant command, and (2) does the combatant command perceive the communication organization's function as being necessary.

The measure of access is rank. The assumption is that a O6 or GS equivalent communication director has access to the combatant commander. This access provides the communication organization the means to interact with the combatant commander to ensure his intent is met.

A discussion of assessment is next. Assessment is described in Joint Publication 5-0 as “a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment.”⁴³ Communication strategy working groups provide a process for assessment. A communication strategy working group consists of members from the interagency, and aids current and future planning. “It eliminates independent informational campaigns and better integrates ‘nonlethal’ actions within the existing military planning process.”⁴⁴ It serves as a means for staff integration. It can also further break “through the doctrinal walls between the public affairs and information operation communities while respecting the delineation of which audiences they are authorized to engage.”⁴⁵

⁴³ Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, xv.

⁴⁴ Gary Luck and Mike Findlay, Joint Operations: Insights & Best Practices, 2nd ed. (Norfolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, United States Joint Forces Command, July 2008), 49.

⁴⁵ Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 3-61 Joint Public Affairs (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, May 9, 2005), xi. PA and information operations (IO) activities directly support military objectives, counter adversary disinformation and deter adversary actions. Although both PA and IO require planning, message development, and media analysis, the efforts differ with respect to audience, scope, and intent, and must remain separate. Commanders must ensure appropriate coordination between PA and IO activities consistent with the DOD Principles of Information, policy or statutory limitation and security. Effective coordination and collaboration with IO is necessary for PA to maintain its institutional credibility.

To summarize, access and assessment are measures of performance for efficacy. Rank is an indicator of access. The suggested rank requirement is O6 or GS equivalent. The reason is most combatant command staff directors are O6 or GS equivalent. A communication strategy working group is an indicator of assessment.

Measuring Efficiency

According to Checkland and Poulter, efficiency is defined in terms of the use of resources. This criterion asks whether the intended activity “is being achieved with a minimum use of resources.”⁴⁶ For the purposes of this monograph, efficiency is determined by asking the question does the combatant command use the minimal number of capabilities or resources to develop communication strategy. Several literature sources highlight the different resources or capabilities available to a combatant command to develop communication strategy. The capabilities are defined as strategic communication capabilities and related capabilities. The strategic communication capabilities are public affairs, information operations, and defense support to public diplomacy.⁴⁷ Civil affairs is a related capability.⁴⁸

Successful PA operations require institutional credibility to maintain public trust and confidence. Commanders should structure their organizations to ensure PA and IO functions are separate. PAOs should work directly for the commander and all supporting PA activities should be organized under the PAO.

⁴⁶ Checkland and Poulter, *Learning for Action: A Short Definitive Account of Soft Systems Methodology and Its Use For Practitioners, Teachers, and Students*, 42.

⁴⁷ Joint Forces Command, *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations*, xxii.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, III-2.

Joint Publication 3-61 describes the role of public affairs. Its role is to conduct public information, command/internal information and community relations.⁴⁹ This role addresses the creator, messages, media, and consumers within the communication system. Public Affairs prepares the Combatant Commander and staff (creators) to deliver information (messages) through television, radios, and print interviews (media) to different target audiences (consumers).

Joint Publication 3-13 describes the role of information operations. Engaging the enemy is the role of information operations. Information operations is defined as “actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.”⁵⁰ Information operations core capabilities are electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC).⁵¹ Some of the core capabilities address parts of the communication system. EW and CNO address the computer system and its operations (media). PSYOP (creator) develops leaflets (messages) with information to address the enemy (consumer).

⁴⁹ Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 3-61 Joint Public Affairs, I-3.

⁵⁰ Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, April 12, 2001), 1.

⁵¹ Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 3-13 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, October 9, 1998), I-4.

Joint Publication 3-57 describes the role of civil affairs. Civil affairs develops actions and messages, which directly address the civil government and populace within the communication system.⁵² Civil Affairs is a creator and consumer in the communication system.

Joint Publication 3-0⁵³ describes the role of Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy assists the Combatant Commander in communicating with the Department of State and other key diplomatic stakeholders. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy addresses the communication system through specific actions and messages. Those actions and messages are drafting diplomatic messages, (messages) coordinating with the Department of State (consumer) prior to a Combatant Commander (creator) conducting a key leader engagement (media) with a foreign diplomat (consumer and possible language), and coordinating themes and messages (messages) prior to Congressional Delegation (consumer) visit.

As indicated from the review of doctrine, there are capabilities that are necessary for developing communication strategy. The capabilities are public affairs, information operations, civil affairs, and defense support to public diplomacy.

⁵² Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 3-57.1 Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, April 14, 2003), II-1. Operational requirements may involve application of CA activities. CA activities may range from coordinating the removal of civilians from a combat zone, through efforts to interface between US forces, multinational forces, HN, and other governmental or nongovernmental agencies, to the exercise of full military control over an area or hostile government or population. The variety of CA activities needed to support military operations necessitates corresponding flexibility in CA organization, planning, and execution.

⁵³ Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations, I-2.

There are non-doctrinal capabilities that are essential to communication strategy. The non-doctrinal resources are the cultural/regional experts. Enabling Strategic Communication at the Combatant Command, written by Perkins and Scott uses the term special activities to identify regional/cultural experts.⁵⁴ The Joint Forces Command, Commanders Handbook specifically cites a need for anthropologist (cultural experts).⁵⁵ The Strategic Communication Workforce Assessment of Critical Skill and Core Competences specifically cite the need for language and cultural experts as part of a communication organization.⁵⁶ Regional and cultural experts are essential to developing communication because these experts understand how messages and actions are understood by local cultures. “Understanding the effect of operations as seen through the lens of the local culture and psyche is the foremost planning consideration for every operation.”⁵⁷ Regional/cultural experts assist with the need to “improve language and cultural capabilities and increase educational and training programs that prepare our people to work in and among foreign populations,” and improve the ability to “assess and produce knowledge of complex social communication systems and the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of populations

⁵⁴ Stephen P. Perkins and Gary T. Scott, “Enabling Strategic Communication at the Combatant Commands,” *Iosphere* (Spring 2006): 26.

⁵⁵ Joint Forces Command, Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy, Version 3, v-7.

⁵⁶ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Section III, SC, (14 March 2010).

⁵⁷ Nathan Finney, Human Terrain Team Handbook (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, September 2008), 2.

and stakeholders.”⁵⁸ Cultural/regional experts address the language and consumer aspects of the communication system.

⁵⁸ Robert M. Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), 26.

Table 1 is a diagram that depicts the literature that recommends which doctrinal capabilities and non-doctrinal capabilities that should be part of a communication organization. The capabilities are annotated across the top, and the literature is annotated down the size.

Literature	PA	IO	CA	DSPD	Regional/ Cultural Experts
Joint Forces Command. <i>Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy</i> . ver. 3, Suffolk, VA, 24 June 2010.	x	x	x	x	x
Department of Defense. "Quadrennial Defense Review Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap." 25 September 2006.	x	x	x	x	x
Perkins, Stephen and Scott, Gary. "Enabling Strategic Communication at the Combatant Commands." IOSphere. 2006. Perkins, Stephen and Scott, Gary. "Enabling Strategic Communication at the Combatant Commands." IOSphere. 2006.	x	x		x	x
Jones, Jeffrey; Kuehl, Daniel; Burgess, Daniel; and Roche, Russell. "Strategic Communication at the Combatant Command." Joint Forces Quarterly., issue 55. 4th quarter. 2009.	x	x		x	
White House. Comprehensive interagency strategy for public diplomacy and strategic communication of the Federal government. Report Pursuant to section 1055 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009	x	x			
Report to Committee on Armed Services. House of Representative. H.R. 2647 . Strategic Communication Workforce Assessment of Critical Skills and Core Competencies for Strategic Communication.	x	x	x	x	

Table 1. Capabilities

The information in Table 1 indicates that the majority of the authors supports public affairs, information operations, and defense support to public diplomacy as recommendations for part of a communication organization's structure. Civil affairs and regional/cultural experts are supported by fifty percent of the articles reviewed.

Efficiency is redefined in terms capabilities. Efficiency, modified from Checkland and Poulter's definition, is the use of minimum capabilities to achieve a given output. The minimum capabilities are public affairs, information operations, civil affairs, defense support to public diplomacy. The minimum nondoctrinal capabilities identified in the literature reviewed were regional/cultural experts.

Efficiency generally is the ratio of output to inputs. No agreed upon measure of output exist for communication organizations. However, some sense of the task needed can be derived by looking at the varying complexity faced by the combatant commands in their area of responsibility. Table Two gives the number of languages, countries, and Huntington-defined civilizations and an assessment of complexity by combatant command.

Combatant Command	# of Languages	# of Countries	Huntington Civilizations	Complexity
AFRICOM	2,000	53	Two – Islamic and African	Medium
CENTCOM	7	20	One -- Islamic	Low
EUCOM	80	51	Two – Western and Orthodox	Medium
PACOM	3,000	36	Six: Sinic, Hindi, Islamic, Western, Buddhist, Japanese	High
NORTHCOM	3	3	Two: Western and Latin	Low
SOUTHCOM	25	32	Largely One – Latin American	Low
SOCOM	All	All	All	High

Table 2- Language and Complexity

The number of Huntington-defined civilizations within the combatant commands' respective areas of responsibility provide a rough approximation of the complexity of the task faced by the combatant commands. Samuel Huntington wrote a controversial article called the "The Clash of Civilizations" in 1993.⁵⁹ He argued that conflict in the future is likely to occur along civilization lines, which Huntington considered "the highest cultural groupings of people . . . differentiated from each other by religion, history, language, and tradition." Figure 1 gives the Huntington civilizations.




Figure 1⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations> (accessed November 10, 2010).

⁶⁰ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations> (accessed November 10, 2010).

At the broadest possible level, a combatant command would need to reflect the civilization diversity in its area of operations. Thus, some combatant commands have only one major civilization in their area of operations while others have more. Some combatant commands contain only major civilizations such SOUTHCOM (Latin American) and CENTCOM (Islamic). Thus, they are assigned a value of Low for complexity. NORTHCOM consists of three countries besides the United States – Canada, Mexico and Cuba and is also assigned a complexity value of low. SOCOM covers the globe so it is assigned a value of High. PACOM covers six major civilizations so it too receives a value of High. EUCOM and AFRICOM fall between these two extremes so they receive a value of medium. Note that these assessments are relative to each other and not absolute measures of complexity. All of the combatant commands face complex environment in absolute terms.

The question from an efficiency standpoint then is to address the question whether the number of resources committed by the combatant commands reflects the complexity of the environment they face. This question will be answered in the case studies section.

Measuring Effectiveness

The final criterion is effectiveness. Checkland and Poulter describe effectiveness as whether the intended activity is “achieving some higher level or longer-term aim.”⁶¹ In terms of

⁶¹ Checkland and Poulter, Learning for Action: A Short Definitive Account of Soft Systems Methodology and Its Use For Practitioners, Teachers, and Students, 42.

communication strategy, effectiveness is whether the communication strategy informs, educates, or influences people to support American interests.

Measuring communication achievement is challenging. It is challenging because of the difficulty in isolating the causal link between a message and a target's actions. It is difficult to ensure that the “quantity or quality...is not confounded by other possible causes”⁶² Furthermore, measuring if communication strategy educates, informs, and influences is difficult because it involves identifying changes in individual and group behavior associated with specific messages and actions. For example, presenting quantifiable evidence to a combatant commander that a tribal leader or the entire tribe made a decision because of a video, leaflet, news release, civil affairs project, or key leader engagement is difficult. The effect (decision by tribal leader or community) has numerous other causes (pride, fear, and honor) that are psychological (qualitative).

No numerical summation of messages and actions equals educating, informing, and influencing a target audience.⁶³ Five messages, three videos, and six civil affairs projects do not equal the tribal leader and the tribe supporting American policy. Therefore, experts agree surveys are the best means to measure effectiveness in communication.⁶⁴

⁶² Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, and Russell W. Glenn, *Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, RAND, 2007), 47.

⁶³ Robert J. Lavidge and Gary A. Steiner, “A Model For Predictive Measurements of Advertising Effects,” *Journal of Marketing* (October 1961): 60.

⁶⁴ Robert J. Lavidge and Gary A. Steiner, “A Model For Predictive Measurements of Advertising Effects,” *Journal of Marketing* (October 1961): 62.

A true measuring of effectiveness requires surveying the combatant commands' target audiences. Several surveys would have to be sent to segments of each combatant command's target audiences. The survey would identify if the target audiences made decisions based on the messages and actions of the combatant command's communication strategy. This task is beyond the scope of this monograph.

For the purposes of this monograph, an evaluation, by a subject matter expert on the combatant command's overall efforts to influence, educate, and inform their target audiences is the measure of effectiveness. A qualitative assessment by subject matter experts is often used when no other means is readily available.⁶⁵ The subject matter expert served a tour as key staff member in the communication organization for CENTCOM/ISAF.

The subject matter expert worked with the other combatant commands while developing the CENTCOM strategic communication strategy, and the Department of Defense response piece for the President's 1055 Report to Congress.⁶⁶ The subject matter expert was asked to rate the communication organization's communication strategy effectiveness on a scale of 0 to 4. The rating is based on the subject matter expert's experience working in CENTCOM/ISF and working closely with the other combatant commands.

The response provided key insights to measuring the effectiveness of the communication strategy. The subject matter expert discussed the leadership of the different communication organization. The subject matter expert outlined how valuable team building and coordination

⁶⁵ Judith S. Sunley, "Assessing the Value of Research at the National Science Foundation," National Center for Biotechnology Information, (1998), <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/bookshelf/br.fcgi?book=nap6200&part=a20006484ddd00073> (accessed November 12, 2010). "The multidimensional character of the contributions of research means that absolute valuations are difficult, particularly given the precision to which the individual measurements can be made. Precision is particularly problematic with assessments of quality, which are essential for research. This introduces some fuzziness in assessing the value of research that makes many outside science and engineering uncomfortable. The lack of precision requires the use of expert judgment in making effective assessments."

⁶⁶ Interview with subject expert conducted via email, October 2010. The subject matter expert used the term strategic communication strategy in the interview. The use of strategic communication by the subject matter expert is similar to the definition of communication strategy. Communication strategy describes the development and execution of actions and messages at the operational level.

was to the communication organization. The subject matter expert discussed presence, in the theater of operations, as important.⁶⁷

Significant Strategic Communication Recommendation Literature

Defining the key terms was necessary, but now reviewing two significant pieces of literature that provides recommendations on communication organization is required. The two pieces of literature are Robert L. Perry's monograph and Joint Forces Command Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy.

Robert L. Perry's Model: Matrixed-Capability Process Organization

Perry's monograph is critical to this monograph because it provides information on the combatant command's communication organization in their infancy. His monograph provides a basis to understand where the communication organizations were as compared to now.

In 2007, when Perry's monograph was published, he used four standard organizational models to evaluate the Combatant Command strategic communication organization. Perry's conclusion was that nine of the strategic communication organizations were a combination of four models (decentralized, core competency, matrixed, and process/horizontal).⁶⁸ He combined the models and recommended the Integrated "Matrixed-Capability-Process" organizational model.

⁶⁷ Interview with subject expert conducted via email, October 2010.

⁶⁸ Perry, "The Organization is Flat: An integrated Model for Strategic Communication within the Combatant Command," 11.

Robert Perry introduced three types of communication models. The three types are decentralized, core competency, and matrixed. A decentralized model is an organization with a small headquarters staff with autonomous decision-making entities. The units make the operating decision and the higher headquarters establishes the strategies and objectives.⁶⁹ The core competency model is derived from the terms competency and capability. “A competency is defined as an ability to perform a function or accomplish a mission, whereas a capability is a facility that can be used for an indicated use or purpose.”⁷⁰ The core competency model is a small headquarters staff with “centralized administrative, training, and similar functions; and focuses the operation on what the organization does best.”⁷¹ The matrixed model “shares lines and staff functions; units report to both capability and functional managers.”⁷² After defining each organizations, Perry combined aspects of all into a single, fourth model.

Perry labeled his idea as the integrated-matrixed-capability-process organizational model. The integrated-matrixed-capability model reflects a combination of three models. The four traits of the model are small headquarters staff, senior executive group, standing working group, and capabilities.⁷³ The small headquarters staff supports the senior leadership. It coordinates and synchronizes a working group to meet the Combatant Command’s intent, mission, and objectives.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 7.

⁷⁰ Perry, “The Organization is Flat: An integrated Model for Strategic Communication within the Combatant Command,” 11.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid., 9.

⁷³ Perry, “The Organization is Flat: An integrated Model for Strategic Communication within the Combatant Command,” 11-12.

It approves themes, messages, and plans. The small headquarters staff and the senior executive group reviews, seek changes, and approve working group plans. The standing working group meets regularly to review the Combatant Commander's strategic communication strategy; review and recommended strategic communication operations and tactics; synchronize themes, messages, and operations of each plan and assess results; and encourages collaboration, consensus, and coordinated efforts. The capabilities (public affairs, defense support to public diplomacy, military defense, information operations, visual information) operate in teams or alone, as needed, to develop operational plans and execute plans reviewed by the working group and approved by the executive group. The capabilities' frequently reports results and measures of effectiveness to the working group for lessons learned, mid-course corrections, and next steps.

Perry's overall idea is sound, but there were some significant shortcomings. The main shortcoming of his monograph "was a review of current practices of Combatant Command's structures that were in their infancy."⁷⁴ He did not discuss communication theory or define the roles and responsibilities of key doctrinal or non-doctrinal resources that aid in communication strategy development. He did identify the doctrinal resources as capabilities (public affairs, defense support to public diplomacy, military defense, information operations, visual information) He did not clearly link theory, doctrine, and practice in the development of communication strategy. His point of emphasis was adversary focused and not holistic in his

⁷⁴ Perry, "The Organization is Flat: An integrated Model for Strategic Communication within the Combatant Command," 11.

approach to communicating strategy. Finally, Perry did not provide details about who was part of the recommended strategic communication organization.⁷⁵

Perry provides a baseline for assessing the development of the strategic communication organizations. Table Three contains his assessment of the capabilities of the combatant commands in mid 2007.

⁷⁵ Perry, “The Organization is Flat: An integrated Model for Strategic Communication within the Combatant Command,” 11-12

Table 3 below depicts the communication organizations at the time of Perry's research.

COCOM	Rank of Director	CSWG	# of Staff
AFRICOM	No director	None	None
CENTCOM	No director	None	None
EUCOM	No director	Yes	1
PACOM	No director	None	None
NORTHCOM	No director	None	None
SOUTHCOM	GS-15	Yes	5
SOCOM	SES	None	None

Table 3 Perry's research

Commander's Handbook for SC and CS

This second major literature necessary for understanding the analysis and argument of this paper is the Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy. It describes the processes and efforts combatant commands use in developing communication strategy. The descriptions of the processes and efforts are important because it explains what capabilities and assessment the combatant commands use to develop

communication strategy. The handbook's discussion of the capabilities and assessment conducted across the combatant commands runs counter to its statement that it is too early to establish a common core for a strategic communication organization.

According to the handbook, "there is a natural tendency to jump to an organization solution before fully understanding if organizational or process adjustments are necessary. The detailed techniques and procedures for how the Joint Force Command should synchronize IO, PA, VI, CMO, and DSPD in support of higher-level SC themes, messages, images, and actions have not been decided, so organizational changes –particularly those that require more resources – are premature."⁷⁶ This statement is inconsistent with the information presented in the handbook and the additional articles reviewed as part of this monograph.

The commander's handbook provided common trends and current processes among combatant commands. The common trends were the use of public affairs, information operations, and civil affairs in the development of communication strategy. In addition, the current process included a working group that assessed communication strategy.⁷⁷ The argument against a common structure is that there is a lack of understanding about organizational or processes. The information presented indicates there is some understanding about the use of public affairs, information operations, civil affairs, and defense support of public diplomacy. The commander's

⁷⁶ Joint Forces Command, Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy, Version 3, v-4.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

handbook labeled these capabilities as strategic communication enablers.⁷⁸ The commander's handbook indicated that majority of the combatant commands conduct some type of assessment.⁷⁹

The commander's handbook stated there is a lack of understanding about communication organization or processes but presented information that was counter to this statement. The trends and processes across the combatant commands indicate that all understand the capabilities (public affairs, information operations, civil affairs, defense support to public diplomacy) are need to develop communication strategy. Eight of the combatant commands conduct some type of assessment of its communication strategy. Furthermore, doctrine provides how the SC enablers aid in developing communication strategy.

Methodology

The purpose of the methodology section is to test the hypothesis that a more efficacious and efficient communication organization should produce a more effective communication strategy. The method is a qualitative analysis of seven communication organizations. An assessment from a subject matter expert and a survey from the department of defense (appendix 1) provided the qualitative analysis. Efficacy and efficiency are analyzed for their relationship to effectiveness. This section explains how each communication organization will be measured using efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness.

⁷⁸ Joint Forces Command, Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy, Version 3, II-6.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

This monograph uses two measures of efficacy, access, and assessment. Access is the rank of the communication organization director and assessment is the existence of a communication strategy working group. The minimal rank is O6. The assumption is that a O6 or GS equivalent communication director has access to the combatant commander. This access provides the communication organization the means to interact with the combatant commander to ensure his intent is met. Assessment is described in Joint Publication 5-0 as “a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment.”⁸⁰ A communication strategy working group is an indicator of assessment.

Efficiency has two components – input and output. Input is measured in terms of the personnel involved and output is measured by complexity of the combatant commands operational environment. The minimal number of doctrinal capabilities and non-doctrinal capabilities used to develop communication strategy is a measure of input. Currently, the combatant commands have both military and civilian personnel assigned to the communication organizations. A survey was submitted to identify the duty descriptions of the civilians but was not received.⁸¹ Another measure of input is the number of resources the combatant commands applies to develop communication strategy. The definition of resources is the total number of personnel within the current communication organization. The measure of output is derived from the complexity of the environment the combatant commands face. An assessment of the

⁸⁰ Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, xv.

⁸¹ Interview with subject expert conducted via email, October 2010. Comment from SME: stated most of the military and civilian personnel had public affairs experience or expertise.

complexity of that environment was made in Table Three based on the number of languages, countries and Huntington-defined civilizations found in the each combatant command's area of operations.

Communication effectiveness is difficult to measure. Generally, experts agree surveys are the best means to measure effectiveness in communication.⁸² A subject expert was surveyed. The subject matter expert was asked to provide a rating on the combatant command's efforts to influence, educate, and inform their target audiences. The rating is the measure of effectiveness. The subject matter expert made his assessment from his experience working on a communication organization staff and working closely with other combatant commands. On a scale of 0 to 4, he rated the organizations only as 2 or 3 and gave them a plus or minus as an indication of whether they were improving or declining.

⁸² Lavidge and Steiner, "A Model For Predictive Measurements of Advertising Effects," 61. Lavidge and Steiner explain the measures of advertising, which include information questions, which are stated in other terms surveys.

Table 4 below is the scoring table used for assessing the combatant commands. The criterions are located on top and the rating at the bottom.

Criterion	Efficacy		Efficiency	Effectiveness
	Rank of director	CSWG	Resources /Complexity	SME
Data				

Table 4 Analysis

Geographical and Functional Commands

Understanding what a combatant command's role is and the complexity of its operational environment are important to this monograph's analysis. This section is the case study section. It includes the reasoning for selecting the seven combatant commands, an overview of the complexity of their communication systems, and the assessment of seven combatant command communication organizations.

The seven combatant commands were selected because of their geographical and functional missions that have strategic communication and communication strategy implications. The geographical commands are United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), United States Central Command (CENTCOM), United States European Command (EUCOM), and United States Pacific Command (PACOM). The geographical commands' areas of operations include different languages, actors, consumers, and messages that have strategic communication implications. The functional combatant command, United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), have a global focus on counter-terrorism that has strategic communication and

communication strategy implications. There are two other functional combatant commands, United States Strategic Command (STRACOM) and United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). These combatant command's focuses (space/satellite and transportation) do not have high strategic communication implications. These two functional combatant commands are not part of the case studies.

The seven communication organizations' communication systems are complex. The complexity is due to the numerous languages and key actors (friendly, neutral, and enemy) random interactions, the 24-hour news cycle, and uncertainty of outcomes.

The complexity is further compounded due to the interdependence of the different communication elements and adaption of violent extremist groups to gain information dominance.⁸³ The complexity by combatant command was assessed in Table Two. This information about the seven combatant command's complex communication systems was necessary to review before conducting the analysis of the strategic communication organizations. The reason it was necessary is that it highlights the significant challenges faced across the seven combatant commands. The other reason is it further supports using efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness to assess the communication organizations.

⁸³ Jamshid Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity: A Platform for Designing Business Architecture*, 2nd ed. (San Diego, CA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2006), 25. A system is considered complex when the parts of the system interact in a manner that is by chance, random, and choice. It is also considered complex when the desired outcome is always predictable. In this case, the creators, messages, medians, languages, and consumers within the Combatant Command's communication system interact by chance, random, and choice that produces outcomes that are not always predictable.

AFRICOM

This section is a review of AFRICOM's communication organization. AFRICOM's communication organization division chief is a colonel. The organization has 12 total personnel. The assumption is the 12 personnel have experience in communication.⁸⁴ AFRICOM has a strategic communication council and coordination group, which conducts assessment. According to the SME's survey, AFRICOM communication organization has the best approach to interagency integration, but has some difficulties in assembling a team. The SME discussed the challenges of AFRICOM location and its affect on its ability to communicate.⁸⁵ The challenge is combatant command's location, Europe, vice the target audience location, Africa.

The combination of a thousand languages, rugged geography, diverse cultures, and a vital need for a secure Africa partner against terrorist groups makes AFRICOM operational environment complex. It received a rating of Medium.

⁸⁴ Interview with subject expert conducted via email, October 2010.

⁸⁵ Interview with subject expert conducted via email, October 2010. Comment from SME: "Best approach to interagency integration out there, but having serious difficulties building the team." There is difficulty communicating with your target audience when located on another continent.

Table 4A below is the analysis of the efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness for AFRICOM.

The rank of the director is O6. The organization has a communication strategy working group.

The complexity is Medium. The total number of personnel assigned is 12. It receives a 2+ in effectiveness from the SME.

Criterion	Efficacy		Efficiency	Effectiveness
	Rank of director	CSWG	Resources /Complexity	SME
Data	O6	Yes	12/Medium	2+

Table 4A - AFRICOM

CENTCOM

This section is a review of CENTCOM's communication organization. CENTCOM's communication organization director is a 07 military member. CENTCOM has an executive officer and the four contractors. Six public affairs personnel, who are not assigned, contribute to the strategic communication organization. CENTCOM has an effects synchronization committee that does the assessment for the strategic communication organization.⁸⁶ According to the SME interview, leadership changes affected communication strategy at CENTCOM. The communication organization coordination between public affairs, information operations, and direct engagement was good, but integration had not occurred.⁸⁷

CENTCOM's operational environment consists of two current military operations and key actors in the global war on terrorism. Because it has only Islamic civilization in its area of operation, however, it received a complexity assessment of Low.

⁸⁶ Roy, "Strategic communication staff spread sheet."

⁸⁷ Interview with subject expert conducted via email, October 2010. Comment from SME: The organization was headed in the right path under RADM Smith and GEN Petraeus, but slight derailment when GEN Petraeus left for Afghanistan. Good coordination among PA, IO, and Direct Engagement, but integration has not occurred. RDML Pittman is good, but the pull of Afghanistan will leave a vacuum if he leaves and RADM Smith retires."

Table 4C is the analysis of efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness for CENTCOM. The rank of the director is 06. The organization has a strategic communication council. The complexity is Low. The total number of personnel assigned is 4. It receives a 3- in effectiveness from the SME.

Criterion	Efficacy		Efficiency	Effectiveness
	Rank of director	CSWG	Resource/Complexity	SME
Data	06	Yes	4/Low	3-

Table 4B - CENTCOM

EUCOM

This section is a review of EUCOM's communication organization. EUCOM's communication organization director is a GS-15, which is the equivalent of a 06. EUCOM communication organization consists of eight personnel, all government service civilians. EUCOM has a senior executive council and strategic communication working group that conducts assessment.⁸⁸ According to the SME interview, EUCOM's communication organization is the most established. It has very good interagency coordination.⁸⁹

Europe is EUCOM operational environment. Its complexity is derived from its cultural diversity and historical significance. Europe "includes 51 countries and territories. This territory extends from the North Cape of Norway, through the waters of the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, most of Europe, and parts of the Middle East."⁹⁰ It received a complexity assessment of Medium.

⁸⁸ Roy, "Strategic communication staff spread sheet."

⁸⁹ Interview with subject expert conducted via email, October 2010. SME comment: "most mature of all COCOMs, very good interagency coordination."

⁹⁰ United States European Command, "Mission & Vision," <http://www.eucom.mil/english/MissionAndVision.asp>, (accessed February 25, 2010).

Table 4C is the analysis of the efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness ratings for EUCOM. The rank of the director is 06. The organization has a senior executive council and strategic communication working. The complexity is Medium. The total number of personnel assigned is 4. It receives a 3+ in effectiveness from the SME.

Criterion	Efficacy		Efficiency	Effectiveness
	Rank of Director	CSWG	Resources /Complexity	SME
Data	06	Yes	4/Medium	3+

Table 4C - EUCOM

NORTHCOM

This section is a review of NORTHCOM's communication organization. NORTHCOM's does not have a separate communication organization. NORTHCOM has a Deputy Director for strategic communication whose rank is GS-15.⁹¹ NORTHCOM has a communication staff of 5 personnel. The staff includes one deputy chief of staff for communications and 4 staff members. NORTHCOM's communication staff works for the Chief of Staff. The communication organization integrates and synchronizes the various voices across the command to achieve the commander's strategic communication objectives. The communication staff leads a strategic communication-working group.⁹² According to the SME, USNORTCOM's communication organization is a supporting effort to the Department of Homeland Security. The communication organization informs and educates only.⁹³

NORTHCOM's operational environment is complex because of the domestic security issues, and key actors. NORTHCOM's area of operations includes the air, land, and sea approaches to the United States that include Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. Nevertheless relative to the other combatant commands in this survey it receives a complexity assessment of Low.

⁹¹ Telephone interview with Deputy Chief of Public Affairs, United States Northern Command, November 5, 2010.

⁹² Roy, "Strategic communication staff spread sheet."

⁹³ Interview with subject expert conducted via email, October 2010. SME comment: Department of Homeland Security is the main effort the Smith-Mundt Act limits Department of Defense personnel from "interacting" with US audiences. The communication organization can inform and educate but not influence.

Table 4D is the analysis of the efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness assessment for NORTHCOM. The organization has no communication director. It does have a deputy chief of staff (GS-15) and the communication staff works for the combatant command chief of staff. Access is to the combatant commander is through the chief of staff who is Major General. The organization has a strategic communication-working group. The complexity is Low. The total number of personnel assigned is 5. It receives a 2- in effectiveness from the SME.

Criterion	Efficacy		Efficiency	Effectiveness
	Rank of Director	CSWG	Resources /Complexity	SME
Data	GS-15	Yes	5/Low	2-

Table 4D - NORTHCOM

PACOM

This section is a review of PACOM's communication organization. PACOM's does not have a separate communication organization. PACOM's communication organization consists of four personnel all located in the Commander's Action Group (CAG). A 06 is dual hatted, primary job deputy chief of staff and lead the strategic communication efforts with three contractors.

PACOM conducts a working group that consists of members for CAG, J5, PA, IO, interagency and others.⁹⁴

The complexity of the PACOM operation environment is due to its geo-political diversity, key military actors, and the aggregate population total. PACOM area of operations comprises of 36 nations that are home to more than 50% of the world's population, three thousand different languages, several of the world's largest militaries, and five nations allied with the U.S. through mutual defense treaties.⁹⁵ Because PACOM includes most Huntington-defined civilizations in its area of operations, it receives a complexity assessment of High.

⁹⁴ Roy, "Strategic communication staff spread sheet."

⁹⁵ United States Pacific Command, "USPACOM Facts, http://www.pacom.mil/web/site_pages/uspacom/facts.shtml, (accessed February 25, 2010).

Table 4E is the analysis of the efficacy, efficacy, and effectiveness for PACOM. The combatant command does not have a communication organization director. PACOM conducts a working group that consists of members for CAG, J5, PA, IO, interagency and others. The complexity is High. The total number of personnel assigned is 4. It receives a 3+ in effectiveness from the SME.

Criterion	Efficacy		Efficiency	Effectiveness
	Rank of Director	CSWG	Resources /Complexity	SME
Data	06- dual hated	Yes	4/High	3+

Table 4E – PACOM

SOUTHCOM

This section is a review of USSOUTCOM's communication organization. SOUTHCOM director is a GS-15, which is the equivalent of a 06. Ten civilian personnel are assigned to SOUTHCOM's communication organization. SOUTHCOM conducts a strategic communication working group.⁹⁶ According the SME interview, SOUTHCOM has great presence in the theater, strong ties with the community but lacks funding.⁹⁷

The diversities of cultures and languages, along with the geographical composition, makes SOUTHCOM operational environment complex. The geographical composition includes "Latin America south of Mexico; the waters adjacent to Central and South America; the Caribbean Sea, its 12 island nations and European territories; the Gulf of Mexico; and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean. It encompasses 32 countries (19 in Central and South America and 12 in the Caribbean) and covers about 15.6 million square miles."⁹⁸ Relative to other combatant commands SOUTHCOM's area of operations is less complex so it receives an assessment of Low.

Table 4F is the analysis of the efficacy, efficacy, and effectiveness for USSOUTCOM. The director is a GS-15, which is the equivalent of a 06. SOUTHCOM conducts a strategic

⁹⁶ Roy, "Strategic communication staff spread sheet."

⁹⁷ Interview with subject expert conducted via email, October 2010. SME comment: "Probably the most promising. Everything they do is about influence operations. Great presence in the theater, strong ties with expat communities, but lack of OCO funding hurts."

⁹⁸ United States Southern Command, "Area of Responsibility," <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/aoi.php>, (accessed February 25, 2010).

communication working group. The complexity is Low. The total number of personnel assigned is 5. It receives a 3+ in effectiveness from the SME.

Criterion	Efficacy		Efficiency	Effectiveness
	Rank of Director	CSWG	Resources /Complexity	SME
Data	GS-15	Yes	5/Low	3+

Table 4F - SOUTHCOM

SOCOM

This section is a review of SOCOM's communication organization. SOCOM's communication organization director is a SES, which is equivalent to a flag officer.⁹⁹ SOCOM's communication organization consists of six personnel. There are three military personnel and three civilians assigned.¹⁰⁰ According to the SME interview, the current communication director is an experienced communication professional with great support from the command. There are some challenges with integrating the PSYOPS and IO communities.¹⁰¹

SOCOM's global focus on terrorist networks, foreign internal defense, psychological operations, civil affairs, and war on drugs make its operational environment extremely complex.¹⁰² Its strategic communication organization has a unique function of integrating SOCOM's communication strategy with other combatant commands and their subordinate units.¹⁰³ Because it covers the globe, SOCOM's area of operations by definition is more complex so it receives an assessment of High.

⁹⁹ Roy, "Strategic communication staff spread sheet."

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Interview with subject expert conducted via email, October 2010. SME comment: John Carman is good and supported by the command. PSYOP and IO coordination presenting challenges to integration.

¹⁰² United States Special Operations Command, "Mission of U.S. Special Operations Command," <http://www.socom.mil/SOCOMHome/Pages/About.aspx>, (accessed February 25, 2010).

¹⁰³ Interview with subject expert conducted via email, October 2010. SME comment: John Carman is good and supported by the command.

Table 4G is the analysis of the efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness for SOCOM. . The director is a SES, which is the equivalent of a general officer. SOCOM's strategic communication integration cell conducts assessment.¹⁰⁴ The complexity is High. The total number of personnel assigned is 4. It receives a 2+ in effectiveness from the SME.

Criterion	Efficacy		Efficiency	Effectiveness
	Rank of Director	CSWG	Resources /Complexity	SME
Data	SES	Yes	4/High	2+

Table 4G - SOCOM

¹⁰⁴ Telephone interview with LTC Tom Hancock, Public Affairs Southern Command, November 5, 2010.

Observations

The following is the quantitative and qualitative analysis, and the key observations from the research.

Table 5 depicts the raw data points from the analysis.

Criterion	Efficacy		Efficiency	Effectiveness
	Rank of Director	CCSWG	Resources/Complexity	SME
AFRICOM	06	Yes	12/Medium	2+
CENTCOM	06	Yes	4/Low	3-
EUCOM	06	Yes	4/Medium	3+
NORTHCOM	No dedicated director	Yes	5/Low	2-
PACOM	06-dual hated	Yes	4/High	3+
SOUTHCOM	GS-15	Yes	5/Low	3+
SOCOM	SES	Yes	4/High	2 +

Table 5 - Observations

From the data, it appears that a better formal structure does not lead to more effective communication strategy. First, all the combatant commands have a minimal effectiveness. None scored lower than 2 on a range of 0 to 4. Some combatant commands are assessed as doing quite well. In particular, EUCOM, PACOM and SOUTHCOM all score a 3 and are improving. Formal structure does not seem to correspond with effectiveness. Most of the combatant commands have

a separate strategic communication organization led by at least an O6 or its civilian equivalent. NORTHCOM has a separate organization but not a dedicated director and assessed as 2 and declining. In contrast, PACOM has no separate organization but performs at 3 and improving. Thus, access and standing up a separate organization seems to have no effect on performance. Except for SOCOM, all the combatant commands have an assessment group. SOCOM apparently does not and scores 2+ for effectiveness. Thus, even the existence of the assessment group is not necessary for minimal effectiveness.

The amount of resources that a combatant command dedicates to strategic communication also does not seem to relate to effectiveness. Some combatant commands, such as PACOM, score high in effectiveness, but low in dedicated resources. Some combatant commands such as AFRICOM and USNORTH score low on effectiveness but high on dedicated resources. There is does not seem to be any relationship between efficiency as measured by the relationship between resources and complexity and effectiveness. PACOM would seem to be the most efficient with a highly complex environment and the least amount of resources dedicated to strategic communications. However, no clear pattern emerges. Combatant commands with a relative large and similar amount of resources, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, and an environment of similar low complexity, have dissimilar effectiveness, 2- and 3+ respectively.

Conclusion

This monograph sought to answer the question, does a properly structured communication organization produce a communication strategy that more effectively informs, educates, and influences the combatant command's target audiences. Doctrine, articles, and this author's communication education and public affairs experience helped formulate this monograph's hypothesis. After research, the answer seems to be a properly structured communication organization does not necessarily lead to a more effective communication strategy.

Most combatant commands have the basic elements of a proper structure for communication strategy. The combatant commands have become better organized since Robert L. Perry conducted his research.¹⁰⁵ Generally, they have a O6 or GS equivalent communication director. They have more communication personnel in the communication organization. In this sense, they have improved. However, a more robust formal organization with better access to the combatant commander does not guarantee a more effective communication strategy. There seems to be no direct correlation between public affairs experience and expertise and effectiveness.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Perry, "The Organization is Flat: An integrated Model for SC within the Combatant Command," 11.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with subject expert conducted via email, October 2010. SME comment: according to the SME most personnel in the communication organization have public affairs expertise or experience. Public affairs alone is sufficient for the communication organization to develop more effective communication strategy.

PACOM would seem to be the most efficient with a highly complex environment and the least amount of resources dedicated to strategic communications¹⁰⁷. This result is due to PACOM's focused efforts on discrete events. According to Col. A. T. Ball, deputy chief of staff and lead for strategic communications, PACOM's strategic communication is execution of plan-focused efforts on discrete events such as operations, exercise, and public affairs that is maybe supported by public diplomacy or information operations in order to achieve strategic level effects. The assessment is conducted within the J8/3 but also independent party provides feedback from predetermined metrics.¹⁰⁸

FURTHER RESEARCH

There are other factors beside better organization that could explain why certain combatant commands communication strategies are more effective. Some of those factors include leadership and competence. Each of these factors should be explored in further research. Leadership is probably one of the most important factors. The subject matter expert commented several times about the leadership shown by combatant commanders on communication strategy. Generally, if the combatant commander placed emphasis on communication strategy there seemed to be a higher potential for the communication strategy to be effective.

¹⁰⁷ Col. A.T. Ball used the term strategic communication. This author uses communication strategy to define what Col. Ball states a strategic communication.

¹⁰⁸ Telephone interview with Col. A.T. Ball deputy chief of staff and lead for strategic communication for Pacific Command, November 10, 2010.

Having the resources in place is not enough. Competence matters and the variation across commands may reflect individual competence. Competence is defined as having domain knowledge of the communication process. Domain knowledge is “the body of facts, beliefs, and logical assumptions that people possess and use in areas of their work.”¹⁰⁹ Doctrine outlines the different capabilities with domain knowledge about communication strategy. The capabilities include public affairs, information operations, civil affairs, defense support to public diplomacy. In addition, the communication director, and staff members that have domain knowledge about the theory of communication, practical application, and experience have a higher potential to achieve the intended communication effects.

Unfortunately, leadership and competence are all difficult to measure. Additionally, it would be beneficial to research the complexity of each combatant commands operational environment. Some combatant commands may be performing better than others because they face a more complex environment. Therefore, their resources should be matched to that complexity. The assessment of complexity used in this monograph is crude and should be developed further.

RECOMMENDATION

Recommendations for this monograph provide some key points for combatant commands. These key points assist combatant commands in progressing toward influencing internal and external audiences to support American interest. The recommendations are derived

¹⁰⁹ U.S. Army, Field Manual 6-22 Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2006), Glossary-2.

from doctrine, key literature, and overall observations. Additionally, there is further research required that would aid in assisting combatant commands' communication strategy efforts.

According to doctrine, there are a minimal set of capabilities and experts that the communication organization should have. Those minimal capabilities include public affairs, information operations, civil affairs, defense support to public diplomacy. Combatant commands should consider ensuring these minimal capabilities in the communication organizations.

According to key literature, cultural/regional experts should be part of the communication organizations. A survey of the current civil duty descriptions may indicate that the minimal capabilities and cultural/regional experts already reside in the communication organizations.

Overall, the combatant commands need to sustain the efforts they have already made in standing up their communication strategy organizations. The formal organizations they currently have seem largely up to the task in that all of them achieved a basic minimal effectiveness.

Mullen thus has a point – better organization is not the answer – getting the message out is. Thus, this monograph has a quite an important negative recommendation, improving the structure and investing more resources will not necessarily make communication strategy more effective.

Appendix 1 – Communication Organization Manpower

Command	Current Manpower			Total Current	Notes
	MIL	CIV	CTR		
AFRICOM	2*	5*	5	12	8 at present plus 4 vacancies – 12 total FTEs (1 x O6 Division Chief (vac), 1 x O4, 1 x GS-14 deputy, 1 x GS 13 (vac), 3 x GS 12 (2 vac), 5 x Ctr). *all or part vacant. Also getting 1 I/A person, possibly someone from DoS, and someone from US Coast Guard.
CENTCOM	3		1	4	4 at present: 1 x O7 SC Director, 1 x O6, 1 x exec (mil), 1 x CTR FTE. Desired growth to 6: whatever mix available. Also, at present there is one billet forward-deployed in AFG working SC issues but not officially assigned to SC. 6 PA personnel also contribute to efforts, but aren't officially "SC."
EUCOM	2(R)	2		4	4 at present (1 x GS-15 Director, 1 x GS 12 equiv, 1 x on-loan O5 reservist, 1 x E8 reservist). End-state: 8 civilians (approved in JMD) (1 x GS 15 Director, 1 x GS 14 Deputy, 3 x GS 13, 2 x GS 12, 1 x GS 9 admin/exec)
NORTHCOM				5	5 at present (1, the acting Deputy CoS for Communications, is the PAO on loan). End-state: 9 (1 x “Deputy CoS for Communications” + staff of 8).
PACOM	1		3	4	All located in the Commander's Action Group. Efforts involve a much larger working group from CAG, J5, PAO, IO, State, and others
SOCOM	2	2		4	1 temporary employee in place (not included in numbers). 1 x Civilian SES SC Director, Senior Communication Advisor (John Carman), 1 x Civilian Deputy, 2 x military “communication planners”
SOUTHCOM	1(R)	5		6	1 x civ SC Director, 4 x civilian planners, 1 x administrative asst (reservist). Goal: add 4 more planners.

Data modified from original. Mission and planned manpower removed.

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